Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?

published in 'Episteme', 2004

I explore the connections between current models of trust in social science and the notion of trust in epistemology. I defend an antireductionist view of trust in epistemology based on a better understanding of the role of trust in conversation.

A Stance of Trust

published in a book in honor of José Louis Guijarro

I argue for a stance of trust as a fundamental ingredient of any act of communication. I describe it as the minimal cognitive vulnerability we are willing to accept in order to succeed our conversational exchange.

Trust, Authority and Epistemic Responsibility

published in 'Theoria', 61, 2008: 35-44

I argue that the epistemology of trust should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards make us more responsible communicators.

Un certain regard. Pour une épistémologie de la réputation.

draft only

In this paper (in French) I argue for a second-order epistemology that takes into account reputational cues, rankings etc in order to extract information from a corpus of knowledge.

What is in my Common Sense?

published in "Philosophical Investigations", Oct. 2008

L-Worlds: The curious preference for low quality and its norms

"Co-authored with Diego Gambetta"

We investigate a phenomenon which we have experienced as common when dealing with an assortment of Italian public and private institutions: people promise to exchange high quality goods and services (H), but then something goes wrong and the
quality delivered is lower than promised (L). While this is perceived as ‘cheating’ by outsiders, insiders seem not only to adapt but to rely on this outcome. They do not
resent low quality exchanges, in fact they seem to resent high quality ones, and are inclined to ostracise and avoid dealing with agents who deliver high quality. This equilibrium violates the standard preference ranking associated to the prisoner’s dilemma and similar games, whereby self-interested rational agents prefer to dish out low quality in exchange for high quality. While equally ‘lazy’, agents in our L-worlds
are nonetheless oddly ‘pro-social’: to the advantage of maximizing their raw self- interest, they prefer to receive low quality provided that they too can in exchange deliver low quality without embarrassment. They develop a set of oblique social norms
to sustain their preferred equilibrium when threatened by intrusions of high quality.
We argue that cooperation is not always for the better: high quality collective outcomes are not only endangered by self-interested individual defectors, but by ‘cartels’ of mutually satisfied mediocrities.